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The DMCA’s Anti-Device Provisions: Impeding the 
Progress of the Useful Arts? 
Craig Allen Nard∗ 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1998, the U.S. Congress enacted the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (DMCA).1 The DMCA extensively revised the U.S. 
copyright law in a manner not seen since the Copyright Act of 1976.2 
Commentators have written a great deal about the DMCA, 
particularly its broad anti-circumvention provisions, embodied in 17 
U.S.C. § 1201.3 Much of the commentary on these provisions is 
critical,4 largely because these provisions have the effect, with some 
important exceptions,5 of greatly limiting access to and usage of 
works protected by “technological measures.”6 This effect occurs 
 
 ∗ Associate Professor of Law, Case Western Reserve University School of Law. This 
Article was prepared for the 2001 Heart of America Intellectual Property Law Conference: 
“Intellectual Property, Digital Technology, and Electronic Commerce” co-sponsored by 
Washington University School of Law on April 6-7, 2001. 
 1. Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112 Stat. 2860 
(enacted H.R. 2281 (1998)). 
 2. See Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Years of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 
1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REV. 2189, 2201 (2000) (asserting that the “DMCA enacted sweeping 
changes in copyright law”); David Nimmer, Puzzles of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 
46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S. 401, 402 (1999) (discussing the significance of the DMCA 
revisions to the 1976 Copyright Act compared to prior revisions). 
 3. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2001). 
 4. See, e.g., Merges, supra note 2, at 2201 (noting that copyright scholars “argue that the 
rushed, industry-backed DMCA is very deeply flawed”); Pamela Samuelson, Intellectual 
Property and the Digital Economy: Why the Anti-Circumvention Regulations Need to be 
Revised, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 519 (1999); Yochai Benkler, Free as the Air to Common 
Use: First Amendment Constraints on Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 
(1999); Julie E. Cohen, Some Reflections on Copyright Management Systems and Laws 
Designed to Protect Them, 12 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161 (1997). 
 5. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(c)-(j) (2000). 
 6. A “technological measure” is a device that allows providers of digital information to 
engage in self-help by regulating access to the information. See Mark Stefik, Shifting the 
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regardless of whether these works are in the public domain or subject 
to copyright protection. In fact, the anti-circumvention provisions aim 
to prevent activity far beyond that which would constitute copyright 
infringement.7 
This Article raises two points about the anti-circumvention 
provisions. First, these provisions seem inconsistent with the culture 
of intellectual property. In the world of proprietary boundaries and 
public domains, there is something special about access to protected 
works and the use of limits to avoid infringement, whether we are 
talking about fairly using copyrighted works or designing-around 
patented technology. Indeed, cultural enrichment and technological 
advancement are achieved by fairly using artistic expression and 
building upon technical knowledge. The focus of this Article is on the 
access and use of artistic expression in patent law.8 
Second, the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA, which 
aim to protect digital expression by erecting technological fences, 
have both an expressive and a technical component. These provisions 
are meant to prevent unauthorized access to and usage of expressive 
content by prohibiting: (1) access per se to works protected by 
technological measures, and (2) the manufacture and trafficking of 
devices primarily designed to circumvent technological restrictions. 
Thus,  patent law,  as well as copyright law, addressed this issue  
of circumvention-enabling technology. Circumvention-enabling 
technology, such as software, comprises patentable subject matter, 
and, resultantly, raises questions about the effect of the anti-
circumvention provisions on patent law’s constitutional mission to 
promote the progress of the useful arts. In particular, assuming patent 
 
Possible: How Trusted Systems and Digital Property Rights Challenge Us to Rethink Digital 
Publishing, 12 BERKLEY TECH. L.J. 137 (1997) (examining “trusted systems” as technological 
measures); Dan L. Burk, Muddy Rules for Cyberspace, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 121, 168 (1999) 
(discussing “copyright management systems as a way to deter unauthorized use of digital 
works”); Benkler, supra note 4, at 414 n.234 (discussing “technological protection measures”). 
 7. See David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 
U. PA. L. REV. 673, 686 (2000) (noting that the “gravamen [of the anti-circumvention 
provisions] is not copyright infringement”); Samuelson, supra note 4, at 521 (asserting that the 
“DMCA went far beyond treaty requirements in broadly outlawing acts of circumvention of 
access controls and technologies that have circumvention-enabling uses”). 
 8. Note, however, that while there is indeed a culture of access and use in patent law, in 
certain circumstances, patent law access and use are overly circumscribed. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/3
p 19 Nard book pages  10/16/2002 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2002]  The DMCA’s Anti-Device Provisions 21 
 
 
protection is important to the manufacturers of circumvention-
enabling technology, one must consider the effect that the anti-device 
provisions have on the research and development decisions of these 
manufacturers and, more generally, to patent law’s delicate incentive 
dynamic. Although the answer to this dilemma is beyond the scope of 
this Article, this issue is something that scholars should pursue 
further. 
II. THE DMCA’S ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION PROVISIONS 
Much of the controversy surrounding the DMCA results from its 
three anti-circumvention provisions. First, there is a basic ban on the 
act of circumvention itself.9 The second anti-circumvention 
provision, like the first, relates to access, but prohibits the 
manufacture or trafficking of devices “primarily designed or 
produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological measure 
that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title.”10 
The third provision is also an “anti-device” provision, but unlike the 
first and second provisions, it pertains to an activity unrelated to 
access. It prohibits the manufacture or trafficking of devices 
“primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing 
protection afforded by a technological measure that effectively 
protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a 
portion thereof.”11 
Further analysis is essential in making sense of these provisions. 
The first and second provisions should be read together because they 
both focus on access to a protected work. The first provision is a ban 
on the act of obtaining access through circumvention itself; whereas 
the second provision proscribes one who assists in obtaining access 
by the making or trafficking of anti-circumvention devices or 
technology.12  
 
 9. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(1)(A) (2000). 
 10. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (a)(2); see also § 1201(a)(3)(A) (stating that “to ‘circumvent a 
technological measure’ means to descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, 
or otherwise to avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological measure, without 
the authority of the copyright owner”). 
 11. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (b)(1)(A).  
 12. The committee report describes these two provisions as follows: 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The third provision, embodied in § 1201(b)(1), is also an anti-
device provision, but it assumes the authorized access of protected 
works.13 This provision is concerned with usage, or what one does 
with protected works.14 It is important to note that if one makes an 
unauthorized copy or distribution of a protected work, of which there 
is authorized access, the DMCA itself is not violated;15 rather, § 106 
of the copyright code comes into play. The anti-device provision of 
§ 1201(b)(1) is only concerned with one who assists the copier in 
making the copy (or, for example, other activity that violates section 
§ 106 of the Copyright Code), by providing the technology to carry 
out the illicit copying.16 The reason there is not a complimentary 
access ban under § 1201(b)(1)—as there is under § 1201(a)(1)(A) in 
relation to § 1201(a)(2)—is that “prior to the [DMCA], the conduct 
of circumvention was never before made unlawful.”17 The reasoning 
for this omission was that the “copyright law has long forbidden 
copyright infringements, so no new prohibition was necessary.”18 
 
[I]f unauthorized access to a copyrighted work is effectively prevented through use of 
a password, it would be a violation of this section to defeat or bypass the password and 
to make the means to do so, as long as the primary purpose of the means was to 
perform this kind of act. This is roughly analogous to making it illegal to break into a 
house using a tool, the primary purpose of which is to break into houses.  
Id.; S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 11 (1998). 
 13. 17 U.S.C. § 1201( b)(1)(C). 
 14. Id. 
 15. See Nimmer, supra note 7, at 689 (“A person who engages in prohibited usage of a 
work to which he has lawful access does not fall afoul of any provision of section 1201.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
 16. Id. at 689-90. 
 17. S. REP. NO. 105-190, at 12 (1998). 
 18. Id. Two anti-device provisions, § 1201(a)(2) and § 1201(b), require additional focus 
because these provisions bring patent law into the mix. Section 1201(a)(2) provides that: 
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic 
in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that— 
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological 
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this title;  
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent 
a technological measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this 
title; or 
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with that 
person’s knowledge for use in circumventing a technological measure that effectively 
controls access to a work protected under this title. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/3
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The anti-device provisions are the most important of the 
prohibitions because “[a]lthough it will not always be necessary for a 
legitimate circumventor to make or use circumvention technology to 
accomplish a privileged circumvention, most often this will be 
necessary.”19 Therefore, given the practical necessity of 
circumvention technology to enable one to make a fair use of a work, 
one would think that there would not be a ban on this type of 
circumvention technology because such a ban would seemingly 
render dubious the utility of DMCA exemptions such as fair use. 
Despite this reasoning, it is too soon to reach such a conclusion.20 
The DMCA, therefore, is a general ban on circumvention to 
achieve access without regard to the existence of infringement.21 
 
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2). 
Section 1201(b)(1) provides that: 
No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, provide, or otherwise traffic 
in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part thereof, that — 
(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a technological 
measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work 
or a portion thereof;  
(B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to circumvent 
a technological measure that effectively protects a right of a copyright owner under 
this title in a work or a portion thereof; or 
(C) is marketed by that person or another acting in concert with that person with that 
person’s knowledge for use in circumventing a technological measure that effectively 
protects a right of a copyright owner under this title in a work or a portion thereof. 
17 U.S.C. § 1201(b)(1). 
 19. See Benkler, supra note 4, at 416. 
(“From a practical perspective, the prohibition on manufacture, importation, or sale of 
circumvention devices . . . is the more important of the two prohibitions . . . . [because] 
[e]ven if a few savvy users can circumvent without relying on the products or services 
of others, the vast majority of users will have to rely on such products or services.”) 
Id. (citations omitted); Samuelson, supra note 4, at 554 (“It is, of course, an irony that so much 
of Congressional debate on section 1201 focused on refining the act-of-circumvention provision 
given that the anti-device provision are, as a practical matter, by far the more important rules in 
this section.”). 
 20. See Merges, supra note 2, at 2203 (“Put starkly, the question is whether a 
circumvention technology deployed to accomplish a privileged use would still run afoul of the 
DMCA.”); Samuelson, supra note 4, at 547 (“The deepest puzzle of section 1201 is whether 
Congress implicitly intended to allow the development and/or distribution of technologies 
necessary to accomplish legitimate circumvention activities, or whether, in essence, it created a 
number of meaningless privileges.”). 
 21. See Nimmer, supra note 7, at 686 (“Note that the gravamen [of § 1201(a)] is not 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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There also exists two anti-device bans—one that focuses on 
technology that facilitates unauthorized access to a work protected by 
a technological measure, and another that is concerned with 
technologies that assist one in making use (e.g., copying, distributing, 
etc.) of a technologically protected work where there is authorized 
access, but in a way that may violate the copyright code (i.e., no fair 
use). Because these provisions focus on technology and not actions or 
intent, a question remains as to the applicability of these provisions to 
a technology that can be used for both legitimate and illegitimate 
purposes.  
III. ANTI-CIRCUMVENTION DOCTRINE IN A CULTURE OF ACCESS  
AND PROGRESS 
The policies underlying the anti-circumvention provisions are not 
entirely unreasonable. Although, there is a need to encourage 
investment in secure systems to induce disclosure of information in 
the digital environment22 and aim to enforce copyright laws. 
Accomplishing this goal without a trusted system is, however, quite 
difficult, if not futile.23 Given the “arms race” between anti-
 
copyright infringement.”). To understand the full breadth of § 1201(a)(1)(A) and (B), consider 
the following. In the nondigital world, one can walk down to a law school library and ask one 
of the librarians to make a copy of an article, for private study, without much concern that the 
copyright laws will be invoked. See 17 U.S.C. § 108(d)(1). Consider if one day, all of the 
copyright holders who have works housed within the library decided to surround the entire 
library with a ten foot barbed wire fence and said that anyone who climbs over this fence or 
makes a ladder designed to facilitate their attempt to climb over this fence, to access protected 
material in this library (even if such copying is legal), will be subject to civil or criminal 
penalties access provisions seek to accomplish just this scenario. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, at 
17 (1998) (“The act of circumventing a technological protection measure put in place by a 
copyright owner to control access to a copyrighted work is the electronic equivalent of breaking 
into a locked room in order to obtain a copy of a book.”); S. REP. NO. 105-90, at 11 (1998). 
 22. Even those who expressed reservations about the sweep of the DMCA agreed that its 
goal of protecting digital content was worthwhile. See WIPO Copyright Treatises 
Implementation Act; and Online Copyright Liability Limitation Act: Hearing on H.R. 2281 and 
H.R. 2280 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Property of the House Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 250-51 (1997) [hereinafter Judiciary Hearing] (statement of Chris 
Byrne, Chairman of Intellectual Property Committee, Information Technology Industry 
Council) (stating that the Information Technology Industry Council “applauds” the 
Administration’s efforts to “protect copyrighted works in the digital environment”). 
 23. MARK STEFIK, THE INTERNET EDGE 58 (2000) (asserting that “without trusted 
systems, digital technology actually increases the publisher’s risk by practically eliminating the 
infringer’s costs of copying and distribution” resulting in publishers “withhold[ing] their 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/3
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circumvention and circumvention technology and the increasingly 
costly quest to build better and more secure systems,24 there may 
have been a perceived need for a legal basis for preventing 
circumvention, irrespective of the existence of infringement. Perhaps 
legislators thought that this legal basis would result in a reduction of 
the costs associated with developing anti-circumvention systems. 
As is often the case with intellectual property, every benefit has a 
corresponding cost. Here, there are two potential costs that may result 
from the anti-circumvention provisions. First, as many commentators 
discussed, society suffers due to the enclosure of works in the public 
domain or copyrighted works that cannot be used fairly, even if 
access is authorized.25 In this regard, the pendulum swings too far in 
the direction of publishers.26  
In addition, there are potential costs for companies that 
manufacture devices capable of circumventing technological 
measures, regardless of whether the device can be used for legitimate 
 
valuable works from the Net”); see also Stefik, supra 6, at 137 (discussing trusted systems). 
 24. See STEFIK, supra note 23, at 62 (“The interplay between ‘attacks’ and 
‘countermeasures’ makes the term arms race an appropriate metaphor for the design of trusted 
systems.”) (emphasis in original); see also Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. 
Supp.2d 294, 315 (2000) (asserting that the availability of defendants’ decryption technology 
requires the plaintiff film studios to “either tolerate increased piracy or to expend resources to 
develop and implement a replacement [encryption] system”). 
 25. This cost is above and beyond the ordinary cost associated with intellectual property 
systems. To promote creative expression and innovation, we tolerate a reduction in access. Our 
patience, however, runs short if we are prohibited from using a protected work fairly (e.g., for 
educational or scholarly purposes) or from using a work that has entered the public domain. 
 26. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 4, at 178 (asserting that if hacking around “technological 
barriers” is not permitted, “the mere act of encoding a work within [copyright management 
systems] would magically confer upon vendors greater rights against the general public than 
copyright allows”); Mark Stefik, Opening Remarks, in LIFE, LIBERTY, AND . . . THE PURSUIT OF 
COPYRIGHT 2 (Sept. 1998), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/forum/ copyright/ 
stefik1.htm (“One corner of the debate on trusted systems concerns whether they shift the 
balance of control excessively in favor of publisher, potentially removing or eliminating other 
kinds of so-called “fair use” currently supported by copyright law.”); Lawrence Lessig, Round 
One: Open Remarks, in LIFE, LIBERTY, AND . . . THE PURSUIT OF COPYRIGHT 2 (Sept. 1998), 
available at http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/forum/copyright/lessig1.htm. Lessig asserts  
that the development of trusted systems “will, through software, give copyright holders 
perfect control over their stuff. Far more efficiently and far more completely than law, 
this code will give copyright holders the power to control access and use, the power to 
disable fair uses, and the ability to keep control of their material for much longer than 
the statutory life. 
Id. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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purposes.27 These provisions banning circumvention technology, 
particularly if broadly construed, may upset the delicate incentive 
dynamic built-in to our patent system. Patent law seeks to strike a 
balance between the promotion of technological innovation and the 
dissemination of its fruits. In exchange for a proprietary interest, 
patent law requires the patentee to give the public notice of the metes 
and bounds of the claimed invention and to publicly disseminate 
information concerning the patented subject matter. This dual 
proprietary/notice function provides, on the one hand, an inducement 
to invent and invest in the patented technology. On the other hand, it 
allows third parties to avoid conduct that would infringe the patent, 
while providing the interested public with information that enlarges 
the storehouse of knowledge, and enables others to improve upon or 
design around the patented technology—thus leading to further 
technological progress. 
Patent law’s ex post innovation theories are a good example of the 
importance of access and technological growth. So, before I explore 
further the potential disincentives associated with the anti-device 
provisions, it may be helpful to discuss these ex post innovation 
theories. 
Copyright law has the doctrine of fair use, which has largely been 
justified in terms of insurmountable transaction costs resulting in 
market failure.28 This doctrine permits a third party to use a protected 
work fairly (i.e., without a finding of infringement), whether it be for 
educational, scholarly, journalistic, or other worthy use.29  
Patent law does not have a fair use doctrine,30 but it does 
 
 27. For example, to access a work in the public domain or use a protected work fairly (i.e., 
fair use under 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000)). In fact, there are concerns even if access is authorized. 
See Samuelson, supra note 4, at 548 (asserting that while § 1201 sets forth several exceptions to 
the anti-circumvention rule where circumvention technology is needed (e.g., encryption 
research), there is “no provision enabling the development or distribution of circumvention 
tools to enable fair use or other privileged uses in terrain which § 1201(a)(1)(A) does not reach 
(i.e., making fair uses of lawfully acquired copies)”). 
 28. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic 
Analysis of the Betamax Case and its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982). But see 
Robert P. Merges, The End of Friction? Property Rights and Contract in the “Newtonian” 
World of On-Line Commerce, 12 HIGH TECH. L.J. 115, 129-35 (1997) (discussing fair use in the 
context of digital networks and the “likelihood of market formation”). 
 29. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).  
 30. Maureen A. O’Rourke, Toward a Doctrine of Fair Use in Patent Law, 100 COLUM. L. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol8/iss1/3
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emphasize the importance of access and use. The importance of 
access and use are apparent when considering patent law’s 
improvement and design-around theory. These ex post innovation 
theories tend to ensure technological advancement. To realize 
advancement, access to, and use of protected technology is essential. 
A. Improvement Theory 
One of the fundamental policies of patent law is to “promote[] 
disclosure of inventions” so as “to stimulate further innovation.”31 
Building upon preexisting knowledge is central to efficient 
technological advancement.32 As Edmund Kitch writes, “each 
innovation generates shifts in the matrix of technological 
possibilities, and the realization of the possibilities may have a 
significance that dwarfs the original invention considered alone.”33  
When we speak of “improvement patents,” however, we must 
keep in mind one of the basic tenets of patent law: one may obtain a 
patent on a particular invention, yet still infringe an extant patent. 
Consider the following example: 
Inventor 1 patents a widget comprised of elements A, B, and 
C. Inventor 2 improves upon Inventor 1’s invention by adding 
D, thus giving Inventor 2 a patent on a widget comprised of 
elements A, B, C, and D (assume D is a nonobvious addition to 
A, B, and C). Although patented . . . . Inventor 2’s invention 
contains each and every element (A, B, and C) claimed in 
Inventor 1’s patent [therefore, even though he has a patent, 
Inventor 2 cannot practice his invention because it would 
 
REV. 1177 (2000) (arguing for a fair use doctrine in patent law). 
 31. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979). 
 32. See RICHARD R. NELSON & SIDNEY G. WINTER, AN EVOLUTIONARY THEORY OF 
ECONOMIC CHANGE 130 (1982); Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex 
Economics of Patent Scope, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 839 (1990); Suzanne Scotchmer, Standing on 
the Shoulders of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 29, 30-31 
(1991). But see James E. Bessen & Eric S. Maskin, Sequential Innovation, Patents, and 
Imitation (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (arguing that in industries where 
innovation is both sequential and complementary, such as the software and semiconductor 
industries, patent protection may reduce overall innovation and social welfare). 
 33. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 
265, 271 (1977). 
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infringe Inventor 1’s patent]. On the other hand, Inventor 1 
cannot practice Inventor 2’s invention without the permission 
of the latter . . . .34  
What we have in this situation is known in patent law as 
“blocking patents”; a situation that is largely influenced by market 
forces. At least three things can happen in this situation: (1) the 
parties cross-license each other, a particularly attractive choice if the 
improvement adds significant value to the original patent;35 (2) the 
parties sell the patents to a third party who will coordinate future 
development and improvement; or (3) the parties fail to come 
together for whatever reason (e.g., high transaction costs) and neither 
party (or society) enjoys the improvement.36  
The point to be made here is that the improver has bargaining 
power in the form of a patented invention that was largely realized by 
access to (or use of) that upon which the patentee built. There is a 
significant difference between being an infringer with a patent and an 
infringer without a patent. Without a patent, not only will the 
 
 34. See DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 5 n.6 (2d ed. 2001). 
 35. See Standard Oil Co. (Ind.) v. United States, 283 U.S. 163, 171 n.5 (1931). Referring 
to cross-licensing, the court stated: 
[t]his is often the case where patents covering improvements of a basic process, owned 
by one manufacturer, are granted to another. A patent may be rendered quite useless, 
or “blocked,” by another unexpired patent which covers a vitally related feature of the 
manufacturing process. Unless some agreement can be reached, the parties are 
hampered and exposed to litigation. And, frequently, the cost of litigation to a patentee 
is greater than the value of a patent for a minor improvement. 
Id. 
 36. Mark A. Lemley, The Economics of Improvement in Intellectual Property Law, 75 
TEX. L. REV. 989, 1067 n.350 (1997). 
While it might seem irrational to think that an original inventor would suppress an 
improvement within her control if it truly was valuable, several circumstances might 
induce her to do so. If the improvement requires a new manufacturing technology or a 
different market approach, there may be substantial fixed costs associated with 
switching over production from the old to the new way. The further removed the 
improvement is from the original invention, the worse this problem is likely to be . . . . 
The alternative to switching over production facilities . . . is also unlikely to be 
attractive to the original inventor. Even if the licensor could extract the full value of 
the improvement in a licensing transaction, which seems unlikely, its market control 
will disappear along with the intellectual property right. 
Id. For a general discussion of blocking patents, see Robert Merges, Intellectual Property 
Rights and Bargaining Breakdown: The Case of Blocking Patents, 62 TENN. L. REV. 75 (1994). 
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improver infringe the extant patent, but he will also be unable to 
preclude others from using his unpatented improvement. On the other 
hand, a patent, while not allowing the improver to escape 
infringement, will arm the improver with bargaining power because 
he is now able to preclude others, including the owner of the 
infringed patent, from making, using, or selling the improver’s 
invention.  
Let us take a step back and look at the improvement process. 
There are times when the written description of a patent (accessible 
to anyone with a computer) will suggest to an improver a particular 
idea or experiment that will not infringe the patent. Here, access is 
quite easy, because as all the improver needs is the patent document 
itself; he will then proceed with his experimentation without the need 
to negotiate a license with the original patent owner. However, in 
addition to the patent document, the improver must often make use of 
the patented invention in his research, in which case the improver 
will either have to purchase the patented product on the open market, 
which conveys an implied license to use the product,37 or obtain a 
license ex ante from the patent holder to use the patented technology. 
Although it is anything but a forgone conclusion that the patent 
holder will agree to grant the improver a license, especially if the 
improver poses a commercial threat to the patent holder, or the 
transaction costs are otherwise prohibitively high,38 the framework 
exists for a would-be improver to make use of the patented 
technology through either a market purchase or a licensing 
arrangement.  
 
 37. See United States v. Univis Lens Co., 316 U.S. 241, 249 (1942). 
 38. See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and the Progress of Science: Exclusive Rights and 
Experimental Use, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1017, 1072-74 (1989).  
The risk that the parties will be unable to agree on terms for a license is greatest when 
subsequent researchers want to use prior inventions to make further progress in the 
same field in competition with the patent holder, especially if the research threatens to 
render the patented invention technologically obsolete; 
Id. See also JOHN W. SCHLICHER, LICENSING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 47, 96 (1996) (“The 
primary transaction costs are 1. The information costs of identifying buyers and sellers, and 
informing buyers of the rights for sale, and 2. The costs of negotiating agreements, performing 
under them, and detecting and stopping violations.”). But see Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace 
versus Property Law?, 4 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 103, 111 (1999) (asserting that technology is 
reducing the cost of bargaining). 
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Licensing negotiations will no doubt continue to break down and 
the risks associated with improvement activity will continue to 
become, in some instances, too great. In these situations, the would-
be improver may channel his inventive energies elsewhere.39 One 
alternative is for the improver to design-around the patented 
invention in an attempt to avoid infringement. 
B. Design-Around Theory 
Faced with high transaction costs associated with licensing on the 
one hand and litigation on the other, the competitor may opt to 
“design around” the patented technology.40 As the name “design 
around” suggests, a competitor of the patentee may purposefully 
circumvent the boundaries of the patent claim and create a 
competitive non-infringing alternative to the claimed invention. The 
practice of designing-around extant patents creates viable substitutes 
and advances resulting in competition among patented technologies.41 
 
 39. This option is not say the improver may not proceed in his experimentation without a 
license, particularly if the improver was confident he could patent the improvement and thus 
position himself at the bargaining table with the original patentee. See Eisenberg, supra note 38, 
at 1044 (“Some subsequent researchers might find it worthwhile to improve a patented 
invention even without a license if the improvement itself were patentable.”). 
 40. A recent example of a company deciding to design around patented technology 
because the patent holder refused to issue a license is the work-around efforts of Bristol Myers 
and Athersys. Bristol Myers has over fifty proteins related to cancer that they were unable to 
research and develop because the patent owners of the genes that coded for the proteins would 
not grant a license to Bristol Myers or demanded an “unreasonable royalty rate.” Andrew 
Pollock, Bristol Meyers and Athersys Makes Deal on Gene Patents, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2001, 
at C2. 
 41. Several economists and courts asserted that a patent grant does not necessarily 
translate into monopolistic market power. See HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMIC AND 
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 156, 219 (1985) (“[A] patented article . . . may compete intensely 
with similar products which are either unpatented or covered by different patents. . . . More 
often than not the patent . . . makes a product ‘distinguishable’ but confers little or no 
measurable market power upon its owner.”); F.M. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE 
AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 446 (2d ed. 1980) (“[F]ew patents are sufficiently basic and 
broad to ‘fence in’ a field altogether.”); see also Jefferson Parish Hosp. v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2 
(1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). In rejecting the majority’s presumption that a patent or 
copyright leads to market power, the court stated, 
A common misperception has been that a patent or copyright . . . suffices to 
demonstrate market power. While this factor may help to give market power to the 
seller, it is also possible that a seller in these situations will have no market power, for 
example, a patent holder has no market power in any relevant sense if there are close 
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The public clearly benefits from such activity.42 As the Federal 
Circuit recently stated, “[o]ne of the benefits of a patent system is its 
so-called ‘negative incentive’ to ‘design around’ a competitor’s 
products, even when they are patented, thus bringing a steady flow of 
innovations to the marketplace.”43  
Access to the patent document is quite easy for both the improver 
and design-around competitor because patents are publically 
available. Unlike the improver, who frequently needs to make actual 
use of the patented technology, the competitor, desiring to engage in 
design-around activity, needs only the patent document. This 
distinction is because the competitor focuses on the patent claims. 
Nonetheless, access and use are very much built into the fabric of 
patent law. The same cannot be said for the DMCA anti-
circumvention provisions; in fact, quite the opposite is true. What if 
an individual wants access to or to make use of a work for parodic 
purposes or scholarly reasons? What if the individual wants access to 
or use of a work that is not protected by copyright?  
 
substitutes for the patented product. 
Id. at 37 n.7; see also Abbott Lab. v. Brennan, 952 F.2d 1346, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (noting 
that “[a] patent does not of itself establish a presumption of market power in the antitrust 
sense”); Chiuminatta Concrete Concepts, Inc. v. Target Prod., Inc., 1992 WL 465720 (C.D. Cal. 
1992), aff’d mem., 19 F.3d 41 (Fed. Cir. 1994). Of course, there are occasions where a patent, 
particularly a pharmaceutical patent, in and of itself confers monopolistic market power. 
 42. See Slimfold Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Kinkead Indus., Inc., 932 F.2d 1453, 1457 (Fed. Cir. 
1991) (“Designing around patents is . . . one of the ways in which the patent system works to 
the advantage of the public in promoting progress in the useful arts, its constitutional 
purpose.”). 
 43. State Indus., Inc. v. A. O. Smith Corp., 751 F.2d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 1985); see also 
Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1520 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
The ability of the public successfully to design around—to use the patent disclosure to 
design a product or process that does not infringe, but like the claimed invention, is an 
improvement over the prior art—is one of the important public benefits that justify 
awarding the patent owner exclusive rights to his invention. 
Id.; In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (“Even after a patent has been awarded 
for a new, useful, and nonobvious practical application of an idea, others may learn from the 
underlying ideas, theories, and principles to legitimately ‘design around’ the patentee’s useful 
application.”); London v. Carson Pirie Scott & Co., 946 F.2d 1534, 1538 (Fed. Cir. 1991) 
(“[D]esigning or inventing around patents to make new invention is encouraged . . . .”); Yarway 
Corp. v. Eur-Control USA, Inc., 775 F.2d 268, 277 (Fed. Cir. 1985). But see SCHERER, supra 
note 41, at 386-87 (arguing that resources used in designing-around patents could be put to 
better use); Donald F. Turner, The Patent System and Competitive Policy, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
450, 455 (1969).  
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C. The Anti-Device Provisions as a Disincentive 
Although the DMCA spells out several circumvention 
exceptions,44 it is unclear whether or not they are mere paper 
exceptions or legitimate exceptions. Moreover, it is uncertain whether 
a “device” capable of circumventing a technological measure will 
render the manufacturer of that device liable under the DMCA.  
In a post-DMCA case, Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes,45 
eight motion picture studios sued “computer hackers” who designed a 
computer program called DeCSS. The movie studios distribute 
motion pictures on digital versatile disks (DVDs). The motion 
pictures are protected from copying by use of encryption technology 
named CSS, which allows the films to be viewed only on DVD 
players and computer drives equipped with licensed decryption 
technology. This technology does not permit the user to copy the 
motion picture.  
The defendants’ DeCSS program has the ability to circumvent 
CSS and permits a person that does not have the necessary licensed 
decryption technology to play and copy the CSS protected motion 
pictures. Defendants posted their DeCSS technology on their Web 
site, thus making it readily available to the public. The DeCSS clearly 
circumvented technology because it allowed for the decrypting of an 
encrypted work that was protected by a technological measure. One 
needed a licensed DVD player to access a CSS protected movie.  
The defendants in Universal argued that their DeCSS technology 
permitted third parties to make a fair use of the protected work.46 The 
court recognized that the defendants “focused on a significant 
point,”47 but ultimately concluded that “[i]f Congress had meant the 
fair use defense to apply to such actions, it would have said so.”48 
According to the court, the defendants were not being sued for 
copyright infringement; rather, they were being sued under the access 
control provisions of the DMCA, and “as the legislative history 
 
 44. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (c)-(j) (2000). 
 45. 111 F. Supp.2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
 46. Id. at 321-23. 
 47. Id. at 322 (“Access control measures such as CSS do involve some risk of preventing 
lawful as well as unlawful uses of copyrighted material.”). 
 48. Id. 
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demonstrates, the decision not to make fair use a defense to a claim 
under § 1201(a) was quite deliberate.”49 
The fair use defense is apparently no defense at all in the face of 
the access control provisions of § 1201(a). Therefore, manufacturers 
have cause for concern regarding technology that can be used to 
simply obtain access to a work that is protected by a technological 
measure, even if the work is in the public domain or can be used 
“fairly.” 
Can one argue that the defendant provides a service to the many 
who do not have the technical skills, such as the comedian or the 
professor of film?50 The Universal court offered the following 
answer: “the fact that Congress elected to leave technologically 
unsophisticated persons who wish to make fair use of encrypted 
copyrighted works without the technical means of doing so is a 
matter for Congress . . . .”51 
 
 49. Id. The Universal court declared that: 
Congress . . . recognized the contention, voiced by a range of constituencies concerned 
with the legislation, that technological controls on access to copyrighted works might 
erode fair use by preventing access even for uses that would be deemed “fair”.  
The first element of the balance was the careful limitation of Section 1201(a)(1)’s 
prohibition of the act of circumvention to the act itself so as not to “apply to 
subsequent actions of a person once he or she has obtained authorized access to a copy 
of a [copyrighted] work . . . .” By doing so, Congress left “the traditional defenses to 
copyright infringement, including fair use, . . . fully applicable” provided “the access is 
authorized.” 
Id. at 322-23 (citations omitted). It appears Professor Samuelson took this position, arguing that 
“[c]ourts should distinguish between circumvention aimed at getting unauthorized access to a 
work and circumvention aimed at making noninfringing uses of a lawfully obtained copy.” 
Samuelson, supra note 4, at 539. She also notes that, fair use “would provide a poor excuse for 
breaking into a computer system in order to get access to a work one wished to parody.” Id. at 
539-40. But see Cohen, supra note 4, at 178. Cohen states: 
 Copyright owners cannot be prohibited from making access to their works more 
difficult, but they should not be allowed to prevent others from hacking around their 
technological barriers. Otherwise, the mere act of encoding a work within [copyright 
management systems] could magically confer upon vendors greater rights against the 
general public than copyright allows. 
Id. 
 50.  Professor Sameulson, noted in an article published prior to the Universal decision, “It 
is unclear whether Congress intended for the technologically savvy who could ‘do it 
themselves’ to be the only ones who could engage in privileged acts of circumvention.” 
Samuelson, supra note 4, at 551.  
 51. Universal Studios, Inc. v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp.2d at 324. 
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What about the argument that a fair reading of the legislative 
history of the DMCA would lead one to conclude that the proscribed 
technology is limited to “black boxes,” and not software?52 The 
Universal court’s reading of the legislative history is not so narrow. 
The court states, “In their Post-Trial Brief, defendants argue that ‘at 
least some of the members of Congress’ understood § 1201 to be 
limited to conventional devices, specifically ‘black boxes,’ as 
opposed to computer code. However, the statute is clear that it 
prohibits ‘any technology,’ not simply black boxes. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 1201(a)(2) . . . .”53 
Assume that instead of a hacker, Company X manufactures 
DeCSS. In this scenario a comedian decides to use DeCSS 
technology to access or copy a scene from the movie on a single CD-
ROM for parodic purposes or a professor of film decides to copy of 
few scenes for classroom purposes, or sought merely to access a work 
in the public domain. Does Company X violate the DMCA? The 
answer to this question is unclear, even though DeCSS allows for 
improper copying as well as what would traditionally be considered a 
fair use or simply access to public domain information. This 
ambiguity may very well lead to the filing of frivolous lawsuits 
against small, but innovative corporations. By focusing on 
circumvention technology instead of infringing activity,54 the anti-
 
 52. This question presents an entirely plausible argument. See Section-by-Section Analysis 
of H.R. 2281, 105th Cong. 9 (1998) (stating that anti-device provision of § 1201(a)(2) “is 
carefully drafted to target ‘black boxes’ and to ensure that legitimate multipurpose devices can 
continue to be made and sold”); REPORT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON COMMERCE, H.R. REP. NO. 
105-551, at 38 (Sept. 1997) (“The Committee believes it is very important to emphasize that 
(a)(2) is aimed fundamentally at outlawing so-called ‘black boxes’ that are expressly intended 
to facilitate circumvention of technological protection measures for purposes of gaining access 
to a work.”). 
 53. Universal Studies, Inc., 111 F. Supp.2d at 317 n.135 (emphasis in original). 
 54. See Judiciary Hearing, supra note 22, at 252 (Byrne statement urging the committee to 
focus their attention on behavior and intent, not technology); see also Jonathan Band and Taro 
Issihiki, The New Anti-Circumvention Provisions in the Copyright Act: A Flawed First Step, 3 
No. 11 CYBER. LAW. 2 (1999) (asserting that the Administration should have regulated “just 
conduct” because “[v]irtually any technology can be used for good or evil”). Unlike the anti-
device provisions, the U.S. Supreme Court, in Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, 
Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984), distinguished between technology itself and use of that technology. 
Borrowing from patent law, the Court stated that there can be no contributory infringement if a 
device has substantial non-infringing uses. Id. at 440-42. To hold otherwise “‘would block the 
wheels of commerce.’” Id. at 441. 
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device provisions are inconsistent with patent law’s constitutional 
command to promote the progress of the useful arts and may 
adversely affect patent law’s incentive dynamic.55 The predominant 
justification for American intellectual property law is grounded in 
utilitarianism. The patent and copyright clause of the Constitution 
itself, “[t]o promote the progress of Science and useful Art,” sets 
forth a utilitarian charge.56 In contrast, the Lockean labor-theory 
posits that property rights are pre-societal and inherent. The 
utilitarian justification is a matter of positive law concerned with end 
results and public welfare lending to their view that intellectual 
property is a means to achieve a “socially optimal output of 
intellectual products.”57  
Moreover, these provisions, particularly if read broadly, as in 
Universal, may have the effect of upsetting patent law’s incentive 
dynamic. Testimony before Congress reflected this concern. 
 
 55. See, e.g., Cohen, supra note 4, at 178 (asserting that if hacking around “technological 
barriers” is not permitted, “the mere act of encoding a work within CMS would magically 
confer upon vendors greater rights against the general public than copyright allows”). 
 56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. The framers, employing colonial syntax, as one would 
expect, were referring respectively to works of authors and inventors when they used the terms 
“Science” and “useful Arts.” In the eighteenth century, the term “Science,” from the Latin, 
scire, “to know,” meant learning or knowledge in general and had no particular connection to 
the physical or biological sciences like it does today. Thus, the operational relationships are 
between “authors,” “science,” and “writings” for copyright on the one hand and “inventors,” 
“useful Arts,” and “discoveries” for patents on the other. See Giles S. Rich, Principles of 
Patentability, in NONOBVIOUSNESS—THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 2:1 (John 
F. Witherspoon ed., 1980) (1978); Karl B. Lutz, Patents and Science: A Clarification of the 
Patent Clause of the U.S. Constitution, 18 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 50 (1949). See generally 
Kenneth J. Burchfield, Revisiting the “Original” Patent Clause: Pseudohistory in 
Constitutional Construction, 2 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 155 (1989). 
 57. Edwin C. Hettinger, Justifying Intellectual Property, 18 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 31, 48 
(1989). Hettinger notes: 
If competitors could simply copy books, movies, and records, and take one another’s 
inventions and business techniques, there would be no incentive to spend the vast 
amounts of time, energy, and money necessary to develop these products and 
techniques. . . . To avoid this disastrous result, the [utilitarian] argument claims, we 
must continue to grant intellectual property rights.  
 Notice that this argument focuses on the users of intellectual products, rather than on 
the producers. Granting property rights to producers is here seen as necessary to ensure 
that enough intellectual products . . . are available to users. The grant of property rights 
to producers is a mere means to an end. 
Id. 
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According to the then Chairman of the Intellectual Property 
Committee for the Information Technology Industry: 
A statutory scheme that creates liability based on the mere 
possibility that someone, somewhere, might misuse a product, 
service, or technology will have a direct and undesirable effect 
on the IT industry’s enthusiasm and ability to innovate. 
Companies will hesitate to develop new ideas, new 
technologies, or new implementations if they have to be 
concerned that someone could potentially use them to 
circumvent a copy protection system. This will significantly 
slow time to market in an industry where the ability to move 
quickly is essential to survival.58 
This testimony reflects the goal of American intellectual property “to 
promote the progress of the science and the useful Arts.”59  
IV. CONCLUSION 
 At best, there is uncertainty in the DMCA’s anti-circumvention 
provisions. Uncertainty and proprietary interests are not well-suited 
for each other. Circumvention technology, whether used for 
privileged or unprivileged uses under § 1201 is clearly patentable, 
making the concern here not for the individual hacker (as we 
witnessed in Universal) who is grounded in a libertarian, 
“information is free” philosophy;60 these individuals are certainly not 
going to avail themselves of the patent law. Rather, the concern is for 
 
 58. Judiciary Hearing, supra note 22, at 252 (Byrne statement); see also Judiciary 
Hearing, supra note 22, at 257 (Statement of Edward J. Black) (asserting that the legislation 
“should be amended to address actions, not devices, and to impose penalties for copyright 
infringement, and not for noninfringing circumvention by itself”). 
 59. See supra note 56.  
 60. See, e.g., John Perry Barlow, Opening Remarks, in LIFE, LIBERTY, AND . . . THE 
PURSUIT OF COPYRIGHT 2 (Sept. 1998), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/unbound/ 
forum/copyright/barlow1.htm.  
Cyberspace is an environment of Mind, and spirit may travel within it without 
objects—real, virtual, or legal. The more each of us puts into it, freely and 
unencumbered, the more we will get back. Let us fertilize this new garden with our 
thoughts. Collectively, we will grow fruits that no one of us could imagine. 
Id. 
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corporate entities who manufacture and traffic technology that can be 
used to engage in legitimate or illegitimate circumvention activity. 
We must keep in mind that we are not necessarily talking about 
technology that is used to infringe a copyright (although it may); the 
technology of circumvention permits one to access a work that may 
or may not be protected under the copyright law and make use of the 
work in a potentially fair way. Will these corporations continue to 
invest the same amount of resources in this technology that they did 
prior to the enactment of the DMCA? 
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